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Abstract 
Our previously described framework for an artificial immune server protects servers on the Internet against cyber attacks. The 
prototype of this artificial immune server adaptively acquired immunity against cyber attacks that exploit server vulnerabilities. 
This study describes our implementation of mechanisms of protection against denial of service (DoS) attacks, and their 
incorporation into the prototype system. Performance tests showed that, once the prototype system learned a certain DoS attack, it 
was able to cause DoS due to false detections. To reduce these false detections, we examined detection performance using simulated 
machine learning techniques. Random forest and extra trees classifiers were able to determine almost the highest true negative rate, 
achieving compatibility between a higher true positive rate and a faster learning speed. These findings indicated that these classifiers 
are suitable for mission-critical servers where high availability, including a high true negative rate and fast learning speed, is 
required. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of KES International. 
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1. Introduction 
The growth of the Internet has led to increased demand for mission-critical servers on the Internet. The key feature 
of a mission-critical server is fault tolerance. However, fault tolerance does not cover cyber attacks that exploit 
vulnerabilities in server applications. Cyber attacks on vulnerabilities that allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code 
can compromise the heart of information security, i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability, although such attacks 
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rarely occur in well-known server applications such as Apache and BIND. In addition, cyber attacks on vulnerabilities 
that cause denial of service (DoS) can compromise the availability of server service, which is a serious problem for 
mission-critical servers. Unfortunately, such vulnerabilities are frequently found in BIND 9. 
Well-known security products, such as Norton Security and Virus Buster, can detect and prevent known cyber 
attacks, but they cannot protect against unknown cyber attacks. Next-generation security products, such as Palo Alto 
Networks traps, CrowdStrike Falcon Host, FFRI yarai, and Microsoft EMET1, can detect and prevent known and 
unknown cyber attacks. In addition, other techniques have been developed to detect such unknown cyber attacks, 
including ROPGuard1, ROPecker2, and SecondDEP3. However, by the time these products and techniques have 
detected a cyber attack, the process of the server application has already lost normal execution control. Therefore, 
these products and techniques must terminate the process of the server application. Restarting the server application 
is not a viable solution, as the same cyber attacks can cause the server application to again restart. 
We previously proposed a framework of an artificial immune server for mission-critical servers on the Internet, a 
framework that adaptively acquires immunity against cyber attacks4. The artificial immune server consists of an innate 
immune function and an adaptive immune function without machine learning. Performance tests showed that the 
innate immune function detected a cyber attack with shellcode that executes a command, following which the adaptive 
immune function acquired immunity against the cyber attack. However, the prototype system of this artificial immune 
server did not have the ability to detect and prevent DoS attacks. In this paper, we incorporate mechanisms of 
protection against DoS attacks into the prototype system, and evaluate the continuity of server service against DoS 
attacks. This is followed by simulated evaluations of adaptive immune function with machine learning. 
2. Framework of an artificial immune server 
An artificial immune server possesses an innate immune function and an adaptive immune function. Similar to 
innate immunity in biological systems, the innate immune function in artificial servers acts to detect and prevent cyber 
attacks on a known or unknown vulnerability of the server application that allows arbitrary code execution. This 
function is analogous to the functions in biological systems of natural killer cells, which kill cells infected with known 
or unknown viruses, and of macrophages, which phagocytize bacteria. Similar to adaptive immunity in biological 
systems, the adaptive immune function in artificial servers learns the first cyber attack detected by the innate immune 
function, following which it can detect and prevent a second cyber attack before the innate immune function. This 
Fig. 1 Analogy between biological and artificial immune systems 
(a) Biological immune system (b) Artificial immune system
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function is analogous to immunological memory in biological systems, which allows the adaptive immune system to 
very rapidly clear infections that it has encountered previously. Figure 1 shows the analogy between biological and 
artificial immune systems.  
2.1. Innate immune function 
The innate immune function detects cyber attacks on a known or unknown vulnerability of the server application. 
If a cyber attack is detected, the function creates a new process of the server application and terminates the 
compromised process. At the same time, the function notifies the adaptive immune function of the detection of the 
cyber attack. 
The innate immune function is required to detect cyber attacks on a known or unknown vulnerability of the server 
application. This function focuses on the detection of cyber attacks that allow arbitrary code execution by exploiting 
a vulnerability of the server, because the cyber attacks can compromise the triad of confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of the server. 
Arbitrary code execution by exploiting a vulnerability must pass through three stages: (1) an attacker hijacks 
program control by exploiting a vulnerability, such as a buffer overflow vulnerability; (2) the attacker bypasses the 
security functions of the operating system, such as data execution prevention (DEP); and (3) the attacker performs 
illegal operations, such as downloading and executing malware by executing a small piece of code, called “shellcode.” 
Therefore, the targets of detection methods can be divided into four categories: exploitation of vulnerabilities; DEP 
bypass techniques1,2 such as return-oriented programming (ROP)5; shellcode execution3; and malware execution6.  
2.2. Adaptive immune function 
The adaptive immune function learns the requests with exploit code corresponding to cyber attacks detected by the 
innate immune function. The adaptive immune function requires no training data to detect the cyber attacks in advance. 
The more cyber attacks the innate immune function detects, the more cyber attacks the adaptive immune function will 
be able to detect. Furthermore, the adaptive immune function should learn not only requests with exploit code, but 
those without exploit code, enabling it to recognize the latter, and reducing the rate of false positive detection. 
In addition, when the server application receives a request, the adaptive immune function checks whether the 
request is similar to those learned previously. If so, the adaptive immune function discards the request before the 
vulnerability that allows the arbitrary code execution to be attacked by the request. In this way, the adaptive immune 
function enables the server application to maintain its own service without terminating the server application. 
The method of the adaptive immune function ranges from binary pattern matching, such as yara 
(https://plusvic.github.io/yara/), to various techniques using machine learning that have been studied in the field of 
artificial intelligence. 
3. DoS attacks 
DoS attacks can be divided into three types. The first exploits a vulnerability that causes cessation of the service. 
This type of vulnerability has been found in several versions of BIND 9 (e.g., CVE-2012-1667, CVE-2015-8704, 
CVE-2015-8705). The second type of attack, such as SYN flood attack and HTTP POST DoS attack, exhausts the 
resources of the server. The third type of attack, such as UDP-based amplification DoS attack using a DNS or NTP 
service, drastically reduces network bandwidth by sending massive numbers of requests or replies. 
The first type of attack can be detected by monitoring the operational status of its own service and can be prevented 
based on the content of the attack request, e.g., a fuzzy hash value of the attack request. The second type of attack can 
be detected by monitoring the usage of some resources (including memory and the number of processes or threads) 
and can be prevented by refusing a connection from an attacker’s IP address.  The artificial immune server, however, 
has difficulties in preventing the third type of attack, even if the server is able to detect the attack, as the server cannot 
stop attackers from sending massive numbers of requests. Effective countermeasures against this type of attack include 
an increase in service sites and the use of services for DoS attack countermeasures that are provided by internet service 
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providers or content delivery networks. This study describes the incorporation of mechanisms of protection against 
the first and the second types of attack into the prototype system. 
4. Prototype system 
The resilience of the artificial immune server was evaluated using a prototype system and a vulnerable web server 
application. The web server application has a stack buffer overflow vulnerability triggered when parsing the value of 
the URI in an HTTP request that allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code, assuming a zero-day attack that exploits 
a previously unknown vulnerability. The prototype system is aimed at protecting the web server application from the 
cyber attack on the vulnerability. 
The innate and adaptive immune functions are provided by IMMUNITY.DLL, which is injected into the web server 
application using the Application Compatibility Toolkit provided by Microsoft. 
As described in Section 3, DoS attacks are detected with a monitoring manager named MONITORING.EXE. This 
monitoring manager detects DoS attacks by monitoring the status of the server, including the operational status of its 
own service, such as abnormal termination of the web server application.
4.1. Innate immune function 
The innate immune function targets the third category (i.e., shellcode execution), as described in Section 2.1, for 
reasons to be described later. The methods of detection of the first category (i.e., exploitation of vulnerabilities) depend 
strongly on the implementation of an application, because these detection methods must build the application by 
enabling a detection feature, such as the “/GS” compiler option on Microsoft Visual Studio, or rewrite the executable 
code of the application to embed the detection feature. The detection methods of the second category (i.e., DEP bypass 
techniques) cannot detect cyber attacks that do not use these techniques. In fact, the vulnerability of memory 
corruption (e.g., CVE-2014-0515) can allow DEP bypass without using these techniques7. The detection methods of 
the fourth category (i.e., malware execution) should be performed in a sandbox that has the potential to detect unknown 
malware by monitoring its behavior, because it is difficult to detect unknown malware using traditional file scanning, 
despite file scanning being the heart of anti-virus software. However, detecting malware in the sandbox is difficult in 
real-time, while real-time performance is required by mission-critical servers, such as web and DNS servers. 
Shellcode execution can be detected by SecondDEP3. SecondDEP can detect and prevent shellcode execution if 
Windows APIs are called on a data area where DEP is disabled, based on evidence that normal code calls Windows 
APIs on an executable area that is mapped into the view of an image section, such as .EXE and .DLL files. When 
SecondDEP detects shellcode execution, it notifies the adaptive immune function, and then restarts the process of the 
server application, as the process loses normal execution control. 
To detect the second type of DoS attack, the innate immune function counts the number of threads of every source 
IP address using API hooking that can modify an API function by intercepting the API call. The web server application 
accepts a connection from a client by calling accept. Therefore, the innate immune function intercepts accept and 
counts the number of threads by each source IP address. When the web server application closes the connection, the 
innate immune function reduces the number of threads by hooking closesocket. If the number of threads is greater 
than a threshold specified in advance by administrators or security analysts, the monitoring manager restarts the web 
server application and notifies the adaptive immune function of the source IP address. 
4.2. Monitoring manager 
The types of DoS attacks described in Section 3 are detected by the monitoring manager. The monitoring manager 
checks the operational status of the web server application, such as its abnormal termination. If the web server 
application terminates abnormally, Windows automatically calls WerFault.exe, a Windows Error Reporting process, 
which makes it difficult to detect abnormal termination of the web server application. To solve this problem, we 
prevented Windows from calling the process using SetErrorMode in the initial process of IMMUNITY.DLL. 
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The monitoring manager uses WaitForSingleObject to determine whether the web server application has or 
has not terminated. If this application has terminated, the monitoring manager uses GetExitCodeProcess to 
determine the reason for termination. If the abnormal termination is due to an access violation, the monitoring manager 
determines whether the abnormal termination is due to the first type of DoS attack and notifies the adaptive immune 
function of the abnormal termination. 
In addition, the monitoring manager checks the availability of the service every second. If the monitoring manager 
does not receive any response from the web server application, the manager determines that the termination of the 
service was due to the first type of Dos attack and notifies the adaptive immune function of the abnormal termination. 
4.3. Adaptive immune function 
The adaptive immune function intercepts calls and obtains the data on requests by hooking recv, since the web 
server application receives a request by calling recv. When the web server application receives the request, the 
adaptive immune function calculates the fuzzy hash value of the request. 
The fuzzy hash is different from traditional hashes, such as MD5 and SHA1. If two different messages are similar 
to each other, their hash values will be similar. The fuzzy hash value is calculated from an HTTP request message that 
includes a request-line, request headers, and a message body (Fig. 2) using the fuzzy_hash_buf function that is 
included in the ssdeep library, a library for computing context triggered piecewise hashes8. The fuzzy hash value 
consists of three parts delimited by a colon. The first part is the block size of the source data. The second part is a 
string of up to 64 characters and the third part is a string of up to 32 characters. For example, the fuzzy hash value of 
the file “C:\Windows\System32\kernel32.dll” on Windows 8.1 Enterprise 64-bit is: 
24576:Mo4X/rC2IqURFx909ZEIyzGoR2a89Gx51jvUx/K:we2IqUf09ZWzGJ9Gx568 
The adaptive immune function then calculates similarity scores between the latest hash value and all hash values 
that have been stored previously using the fuzzy_compare function included in the ssdeep library. Similarity 
scores range from 0 to 100, where 0 indicates that two hash values do not match at all, while 100 indicates that two 
hash values are almost the same. If at least one score is more than zero, the adaptive immune function determines that 
the request has exploit code and discards the request. If all the scores are equal to zero, the adaptive immune function 
determines that the request has no exploit code and delivers the request to the caller of recv. In addition, the adaptive 
immune function temporarily keeps the hash value for the detection by SecondDEP. If SecondDEP notifies the 
adaptive immune function of the detection, the adaptive immune function stores the hash value.  
When the web server application establishes a connection from a client, the adaptive immune function checks if 
the source IP address of the connection is included in a blacklist; i.e., a list of source IP addresses previously used for 
cyber attacks. If the IP address is included in the blacklist, the adaptive immune function closes the connection. If the 
innate immune function notifies the adaptive immune function of the source IP address, the adaptive immune function 
adds the IP address to the blacklist. 
POST /test.html HTTP/1.1
Accept: text/html, application/xhtml+xml, */*
Accept-Language: ja-JP
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (WindowsNT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: localhost
DNT: 1
Connection: Keep-Alive
 
q=9YE3YCQJUQFSBXUIP6VDH0SGCCI12HPK308W6TFJ47YT38Q38LAOU4EH9I75PKZJMTU7J2HM2SMU8KS1LXH5YVH4W8WPSNNF2M7CICN
OECJV8L5WMIE0Z08ZNTBL7F6NYM33RQA1S4MOVEWXJYBD2NWLWA7X24V5RRB06M86QOT1V4PMAE0SAIG9OAD5OP6G99IFVGF
Fig. 2 Normal request data including a request-line, request headers and a message body 
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5. Performance tests 
Performance tests were conducted with the prototype system to evaluate the resilience of the artificial immune 
server. All performance tests were conducted on Windows 8.1 Enterprise 64-bit. Five performance tests were 
conducted: 
x Type-A: attack using a request with shellcode that executes a command 
x Type-B: DoS attack using a request with shellcode that cause an infinite loop 
x Type-C: DoS attack using a request with junk code that terminates its own process 
x Type-D: DoS attack using a request without shellcode that causes an infinite loop 
x Type-E: slow HTTP POST DoS attack using a slowloris script
All Type-A to Type-C attacks exploit the same vulnerability, but use different request data, because each type of 
attack has a different target. Type-A attacks aim to execute arbitrary code, whereas Type-B and Type-C attacks aim 
to cause DoS. Type-B attacks cause DoS by executing shellcode that causes an infinite loop, whereas Type C attacks 
cause the termination of a server process by sending a request with junk code that triggers access violation. Because 
the request data of Type-B and Type-C attacks differ, these DoS attacks were considered separately. Type-D attacks 
exploit another vulnerability, which causes an infinite loop by sending a request with a special method “DOS,” 
assuming that the method is incompletely implemented (i.e., a bug) or was designed for debugging by developers, 
who forgot to remove the method. The pattern of the request is different from those of all the others in that it specifies 
the DOS method. Type-E attacks differ from all other attacks, in that they do not exploit a vulnerability, but attempt 
to exhaust the resources of a server. SYN flood DoS attacks are not included in the performance tests, because SYN 
flood protection is enabled by default since Windows 2003 SP1. 
5.1. Type-A: attack using a request with shellcode that executes a command 
The attack request with shellcode used to assess the vulnerability of the web server application was the same as in 
our previous work4. We generated 100 different shellcodes using the “alpha_upper” encoder provided by Metasploit 
Framework and then attacked the web server application by sending the 100 attack requests and a random query string. 
The first attack was detected by the innate immune function and learned by the adaptive immune function, which, in 
turn, detected all 99 subsequent attack requests. That is, the prototype system was able to maintain web service in all 
attacks except the first.  
Next, we investigated the rate of false detection of normal requests by the adaptive immune function. After the 
adaptive immune function learned the first attack, we generated 100 POST requests and 100 GET requests with a 
random query string and sent them to the web server application. All of the requests were properly accepted, with no 
false positives detected. 
5.2. Type-B: DoS attack using a request with shellcode that causes an infinite loop 
We generated different 100 shellcodes that cause an infinite loop. Each shellcode contained randomly generated 
junk code to make detection difficult, with the shellcode subsequently encoded into an alphanumeric uppercase text, 
as described in Section 5.1. To evaluate the resilience of Type-B attacks, the web server application was attacked by 
sending 100 attack requests with the shellcode and a random query string. The first attack was detected by the innate 
immune function and learned by the adaptive immune function, which, in turn, subsequently detected all 99 
subsequent attack requests. 
The rate of false detection of normal requests after the adaptive immune function learned the first attack was 
investigated as described in Section 5.1. All of the requests were properly accepted, with no false positives detected. 
5.3. Type-C: DoS attack using a request with junk code that terminates its own process 
We generated 100 attack requests with a random query string and junk code that overwrites a return address with 
a random address. Receipt by the web server application of the attack request causes an access violation, and Windows 
terminates the process of the web server application. To evaluate the resilience of Type-C attacks, the web server 
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application was attacked by sending 100 attack requests. The innate immune function detected the first attack and 
detected all 99 of the subsequent attack requests. 
As in Section 5.1, we investigated the rate of false detection of normal requests after the adaptive immune function 
learned the first attack. All of the requests were properly accepted, with no false positives. 
5.4. Type-D: DoS attack using a request without shellcode  that causes an infinite loop 
Assuming the vulnerability that causes an infinite loop without shellcode, we modified the web server application 
to trigger an infinite loop if an original method of “DOS” was specified in the method of the HTTP request-line. We 
generated 100 DOS requests with a random query string. To evaluate the resilience of Type-D attacks, the web server 
application was attacked by sending 100 attack requests. The innate immune function detected the first attack and the 
99 subsequent attack requests. 
We also investigated the rate of false detection of normal requests after the adaptive immune function learned the 
first attack, as described in Section 5.1. Unfortunately, the adaptive immune function caused DoS due to all requests 
with the GET and POST methods being identified as false positives. The range of attack request scores overlapped 
within the range of normal request scores, using both the GET and POST methods, making it difficult to distinguish a 
normal request from an attack request. 
5.5. Type-E: slow HTTP POST DoS attack using a slowloris script 
Slow HTTP POST DoS attack is a technique of DoS attacks that sends a request with a legitimate HTTP POST 
header and includes a “Content-Length” field to specify the size of the message body to follow. An attacker 
establishes many connections and sends actual messages bodies at an extremely slow rate until the resources of the 
server are exhausted. This exploits the specification of the web server application that it cannot disconnect until all 
data are received. 
To evaluate the resilience of Type-E attacks, the web server application was attacked five times using a 
slowloris script (https://github.com/llaera/slowloris.pl), with a command line of: 
# perl slowloris.pl –dns 192.168.11.5 –num 1000 
The “dns” option was specified for the target IP address. The “num” option was specified for the number of 
sockets used for connections. After the adaptive immune function learned the first attack, the adaptive immune 
function detected the second attack from the IP address. 
As in Section 5.1, we also investigated the rate of false detection of normal requests from a different IP address 
after the adaptive immune function learned the first attack from the first IP address. All of the requests were properly 
accepted without any detection of false positives. 
6. Simulated evaluations of adaptive immune function with machine learning 
Evaluations of the prototype system showed that, after learning Type-D attacks, the system falsely denied all 
normal requests. This problem was caused by the dependence on a single scale of similarity scores of two hash values. 
To mitigate this problem, we focused on machine learning, as this was regarded as suitable for classifications based 
on a plurality of scales. This section describes the mechanism of an adaptive immune function with machine learning 
and compares the detection accuracy of classifiers of machine learning. 
6.1. Mechanism of adaptive immune function with machine learning 
The adaptive immune function of the prototype system learns only the fuzzy hash values corresponding to the 
requests detected by the innate immune function. An adaptive immune function with machine learning requires 
learning the fuzzy hash values of both normal and attack requests. The fuzzy hash value of an attack request is learned 
whenever it is detected by the innate immune function, whereas the fuzzy hash value of a normal request is learned 
whenever a server application completes the transmission of a response corresponding to a normal request. The 
adaptive immune function does not learn based on classification of the adaptive immune function itself; i.e., the 
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adaptive immune function does not learn the fuzzy hash value of requests that it classifies as attack requests, because 
the adaptive immune function cannot always correctly classify all requests. 
6.2. Comparisons of the detection accuracy of classifiers 
Simulated evaluations were performed using scikit-learn, which provides a Python library for machine 
learning. All classifiers provided by scikit-learn were compared, except for some classifiers that take a long 
time to learn and do not classify any attack requests as attack requests. The estimator of OneVsOneClassifier 
and OutputCodeClasifier was set to LinearSVC. All other options of all classifiers were set to default values. 
Input data of the classifier were fuzzy hash values. If each part of the fuzzy hash value was less than its maximum 
length, padding with null bytes was inserted into each part to ensure its maximum length alignment. Output data of 
the classifier were boolean values indicating whether or not a request was normal.   
In simulations, 50 randomly generated requests of a GET method and 50 randomly generated requests of a POST 
method were learned in advance. Only a single attack request with shellcode that executes a command was learned, 
as it was assumed that the innate immune function detects the attack request after the adaptive immune function falsely 
classifies the attack request as a normal request. 
Test data consisted of 400 randomly generated normal requests, 200 each generated by a GET method and a POST 
method, and 400 randomly generated attack requests, 100 each of Types-A through -D, as described in Section 5.   
Simulations were performed by rearranging the transmission order of requests for the test data. The detection 
accuracy of the simulation was defined as the proportions of true positives and true negatives relative to the total 
number of test requests. The true positives and negatives corresponded to attack and normal requests, respectively, 
correctly classified by the adaptive immune function. Figure 3 shows boxplots of the average detection accuracy and 
line plots of the average time required for learning of 100 trials of each classifier.  
The best classifier was the gradient boosting classifier with a detection accuracy of 85.7%, corresponding to 
average true positive and true negative rates of 75.7% and 95.8%, respectively. The gradient boosting classifier, 
however, required the longest time for learning. The likely reason the gradient boosting classifier had the highest 
accuracy was its use of multiple decision tree classifiers to increase accuracy. These classifiers are called “ensemble 
learning” and include bagging, extra trees, random forest and AdaBoost classifiers. Interestingly, these classifiers can 
be assorted into the top six classifiers shown in Figure 3. Consequently, the ensemble learning classifier seems suitable 
for the adaptive immune function. As they require multiple classifiers, the ensemble learning classifiers tend to take 
more time to build all classifiers. In particular, the gradient boosting and AdaBoost classifiers are slower than the 
others, because they build classifiers sequentially, whereas the bagging classifier builds classifiers in parallel. 
The true positive rates of ensemble learning classifiers are significantly lower than their true negative rates. As, in 
general, there is a trade-off between these two rates, detection accuracy would be biased toward one or the other. 
However, the relationship, in which the true positive rate is lower than the true negative rate, as more suitable for our 
artificial immune server than the inverse relationship, in which the true negative rate is lower than the true positive 
rate. In the former, the innate immune function will detect and prevent an attack even if that attack is not detected by 
the adaptive immune function. In addition, a low true negative rate is likely to cause DoS by the adaptive immune 
function. Therefore, our artificial immune server focused on the true negative rather than the true positive rate. 
The compatibility of the true negative rate with learning speed to maintain high availability of the server, as well 
as random forest and extra trees classifiers, are considered suitable for mission-critical servers requiring high 
availability. For example, the average true positive and true negative rates of the random forest classifier were 60.7% 
and 96.7%, respectively. The random forest classifier is approximately 8 times faster than the gradient boosting 
classifier. Although Figure 3 appears to show that the decision tree classifier is suitable for the adaptive immune 
function, the true negative rate of the decision tree classifier was 87% (Fig. 4), less than the true negative rates of the 
random forest and extra tree classifiers. As above, our artificial immune server focused on the true negative rate, as 
the innate immune function prevents attacks. Therefore, the random forest classifier may be suitable for mission-
critical servers. 
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7. Related work 
7.1. Immunity related security systems 
Immunity related security systems include an artificial immune system9 and a computer immune system10. The 
former has been incorporated into Symantec antivirus products (i.e. Norton Security series), which focuses on 
individual clients, not servers. In addition, this system is not fully automated, as it requires malware analysts to 
determine whether or not a suspicious program is malware. Therefore, this system is not suitable for mission-critical 
servers. In contrast, the ability to fully automate our artificial immune server makes it suitable for mission-critical 
servers. This system is an immunity-based system inspired by clonal selection theory. The latter focuses on detecting 
anomalies in application, not on recovery. Unfortunately, its detection ability remains inadequate for practical use, 
because the system depends on coincidences between randomly generated non-self patterns and anomalous patterns 
in the wild. 
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7.2. Related work for resilient servers 
The framework of an artificial immune server is designed to provide resilience against cyber attacks. Our approach 
makes a server application more resilient by attaching a security module “IMMUNITY.DLL” to it. Other approaches 
to make a server machine more resilient include a virtualization technique11,12,13, including the use of a Xen-based 
resilient server using a self-repair network model11. The resilient server is susceptible to cyber attacks that exploit a 
vulnerability, because it consists of homogeneous virtual machines; i.e., all virtual machines may have the same 
vulnerability. The ability of the resilient server to resist cyber attacks was improved by diversifying virtual machines 
that run different implementations of the same server protocol specification on different operating systems12,13. Our 
approach has the advantage of not requiring diverse operating systems and server implementations. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
We proposed mechanisms of protection against DoS attacks and incorporated them into our previous prototype 
system. Performance tests showed that this prototype system adaptively acquired immunity against four types of attack. 
However, once the adaptive immune function learned Type-D attacks, it caused DoS due to false detections. To reduce 
the rate of false detections, we examined detection performance by simulating machine learning techniques. Random 
forest and extra trees classifiers had close to the highest possible true negative rates, with compatibility between higher 
true positive rate and faster learning speed, suggesting that these classifiers are suitable for mission-critical servers 
requiring high availability. Finally, this study evaluated security techniques associated with immunity and resilient 
computing for servers on the Internet.  
Future work includes the application of the framework of the artificial immune server to known server applications, 
such as Apache 2 and BIND 9, and to evaluate their availability. 
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